

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

29 March 1962

25X1

[redacted] Copy No. C 7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

29 March 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

- [Redacted]
- 25X1
- 2. France-Algeria: PAG official expresses guarded satisfaction with action by French Army against OAS. (Page i)
 - 3. Congo: Adoula-Tshombé talks continue stymied. (Page ii)
 - 4. Angola: Holden Roberto under pressure to merge with Communist-backed nationalist group. (Page iii)
 - 5. British Guiana: Governor warns disorders could recur at any time. (Page iii)
 - 7. Situation Report: Ecuador. (Page v)
- 25X1
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- 25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 March 1962

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

*France-Algeria: An official representative of the PAG, in a 27 March conversation with Ambassador Walmsley in Tunis, expressed guarded satisfaction with action the French Army has taken so far to crush the OAS. The ambassador feels, however, that the PAG is not yet ready to consider the army as a firm ally against the OAS. Algiers and Oran remained relatively quiet yesterday, with reinforced army units and settlers apparently in an uneasy stand-off following the 26 March clash in which a reported 53 demonstrators were killed.

i

[Redacted] 25X1

The army is continuing its systematic efforts to neutralize the OAS stronghold of Bab-el-Oued through searches and arrests.

The OAS is attempting to divide the army and intensify the European settlers' anti-Moslem feelings; pamphlets were distributed in Algiers on 28 March alleging that the demonstrators were killed by Moslem soldiers of the French Army. Official army spokesmen have also said that most of the deaths were caused by "weary, nervous Moslem troops" but claim that these troops were under fire from OAS snipers.

25X1

Congo: [The Adoula-Tshombé talks are apparently still bogged down over Tshombé's continued insistence that any agreement he makes must be ratified by the Katangan Assembly. There have been no discussions of practical financial, economic, or military measures for Katanga's reintegration. Tshombé continues to press hard for constitutional changes, while Adoula insists that he cannot suspend the so-called Loi Fondamentale, the Belgian-drafted constitution, through any bilateral agreement with Tshombé.]

[Adoula, in an apparent attempt to break the impasse, has called for members of all six provincial assemblies, including Katanga, to meet at the University of Lovanium on 2 April.]

[Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak feels that the talks must be allowed to continue "in Bantu fashion" without undue outside interference. He believes that any attempt by the UN to siphon off Katanga's revenues by placing Leopoldville officials in Katanga to collect mining taxes would result in renewed hostilities.]

25X1

29 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1 [Redacted]

Angola: Holden Roberto may lose the leadership of the Angolan nationalist movement as a result of increasing pressure from other Angolan nationalists to merge his Angolan Peoples' Union (UPA) in a united front with the Communist-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Roberto reportedly is setting up a "national front" with a minor Angolan nationalist party in an effort to divert this pressure, and hopes to follow this up in a few days with the formation of a provisional government. The "national front" reportedly will refuse to cooperate with the MPLA, although it will invite other organizations to join with it. MPLA leaders, however, are said to be confident that Roberto's standing in the party has been undermined by the recent defections of some of his lieutenants, and believe that a new group of UPA leaders, who will not oppose cooperation with their organization, is about to emerge.

25X1 [Redacted]

British Guiana: The British Governor of Guiana expressed a pessimistic view of the colony's future to US officials on 25 March. He believes disorders could recur at any time despite the continued presence of 600 British troops. The Governor is particularly concerned over the danger of future racial conflicts. London has offered to increase the local police force from 1,500 to 2,000.

Colonial Office Under Secretary Fraser returned from his recent visit to the colony sharing the Governor's pessimistic outlook and anxious that Britain quit the colony as soon as possible. London has apparently not yet decided whether to postpone the independence conference now scheduled for May.

(Backup, Page 1)

29 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

Situation Report--Ecuador: Since he became president on 9 November, Arosemena has adhered to middle-of-the-road policies which have subjected him to strong criticism from both right and left, culminating in plots to force his resignation. A group of military leaders and conservatives, who favor breaking relations with Cuba and oppose tolerance of leftists in important government posts, plans to force Arosemena to resign in favor of the vice president. Several of the "constitutional coups" this group had planned since late December were called off when Arosemena showed willingness to risk civil war to retain office. The plotters may now be waiting for the outcome of the congressional elections on 3 June. If Arosemena's supporters win a strong majority in Congress, the plotters will be forced to decide whether to launch a coup or to accept Arosemena rather than affront public opinion.

President Arosemena announced late yesterday that a military insurrection had occurred in the southern city of Cuenca but that it had no repercussions elsewhere. The president said the situation is under control. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

29 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 28 March approved the following National Intelligence Estimates:

[SNIE 36.1-62: "Prospects for Nasser," dated 28 March 1962,]

25X1

[SNIE 13-3-62: "Probable Consequences of Chinese Nationalist Military Operations on the China Mainland," dated 28 March 1962,]

25X1

[Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of USIB approval, and the printed text within five days.]


29 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

25X1

Situation in British Guiana


[Governor Grey considers the Jagan administration extremely incompetent and foresees a chaotic situation "on which Communism could capitalize." The Governor predicted that there will soon be "no money in the till"--despite London's recent advance of \$1,298,000--and that Jagan will shortly make a "real" effort to obtain bloc aid. Jagan has already sent missions to bloc countries to discuss various projects, but one official who just returned from the bloc claims he got no firm credit offers.]

25X1

[London seems to feel that the principal prerequisite for holding the May independence conference on schedule is a degree of prior agreement between Jagan and opposition leaders D'Aguiar and Burnham on a constitution. Parliamentary Under Secretary Fraser, who will be influential in determining London's decision, envisages independence no later than early 1963. Another Colonial Office official who recently visited British Guiana commented that by stalling, the opposition leaders could delay independence and probably force new elections.]

25X1

25X1



29 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

25X1

Situation Report: Ecuador

The Ecuadorean cabinet is made up predominantly of conservatives and moderates. The Communists are the only national party not represented, but some alleged Communists have been appointed to subsecretarial posts, and the Ministry of Education has reportedly been strongly infiltrated.

Arosemena has ignored a request from the rightist plotters that he expel leftists from the government and break diplomatic relations with Cuba. On the other hand, he has spoken out strongly against domestic Communism and "subversion by Castroite elements." He directed his ambassador to the UN to support the US in the dispute with Cuba, and he appointed Ecuador's first representative of ambassadorial rank to the Vatican.

Arosemena has sufficient military and political backing in the coastal provinces to warrant a relatively independent position. Although the commanding officers of the armed forces and the minister of defense claim to have enough control of the armed services to force Arosemena out and establish a military junta, the officers of the coastal provinces have stated that they would not support such a move.

With congressional elections scheduled for 3 June, the plotters may decide to postpone a decision on a definite line of action until they can gauge Arosemena's post-election strength. His main political backing is in the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP), centered in Guayaquil. If the CFP makes significant gains, the rightists will have to decide between armed revolt and acceptance. If the CFP does not improve its electoral position, they will be encouraged to renew efforts to cow Arosemena without removing him from office.

Ecuador's economic problems add to the general dissatisfaction. Former President Velasco's irresponsible fiscal and monetary policies--which led to his downfall--forced Arosemena's administration to adopt a program of foreign exchange stringency and fiscal austerity. Needed reforms and development programs have been postponed for lack of funds, exchange speculation has created some reluctance to invest and some flight of capital, and there is a manifest lack of confidence in the economy. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT**The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET